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Land Shortage, Customary Law, and 
Smallholders
Land is a key asset for most people in rural Malawi. To have access to and 
control over land is crucial for constructing their livelihood strategies. This 
chapter seeks to clarify the interrelationship between people’s strategies to 
obtain land rights on the one hand, and indigenous land tenure systems and 
customary inheritance rules on the other. The chapter highlights both flexible 
and strict applications of land tenure systems and inheritance rules in land 
transactions. These different applications are influenced by many factors such 
as the degree of land scarcity, life history of residents, and various strategies 
adopted by farmers to secure access to land. The complex nature of actual 
land transactions implies that oversimplified views of land tenure systems 
and inheritance rules based on a matrilineal/patrilineal dichotomy or a unidi-
rectional evolutionary perspective may be misleading.1
2.1 Debates on Customary Land Law in Africa
Customary law (including customary land tenure and inheritance rules) in 
Africa attracted much interest from early British colonial officials and anthro-
pologists because it provided the ideological underpinnings for colonial rule. 
Many of the customary laws were studied and their fundamental principles 
(as anthropologists understood them) were published. In some cases, these 
studies led to the codification of customary law through the writing of a single, 
CHAPTER  2 LAND SHORTAGE, CUSTOMARY LAW, AND SMALLHOLDERS22 23
authoritative  version  of  customary  laws  by  colonial  and  postcolonial 
authorities.
The stylized and abstract views on customary laws were later subjected to 
criticism by many scholars. Leach (1961) provided a classic critique on the 
lack of a fit between reality and abstract principles found in the early anthro-
pologists’ descriptions of customary laws and rules. Leach warned of the an-
thropologists’ tendency to abstract and emphasized the importance of starting 
one’s analysis from a concrete reality rather than from an abstract reality.2 
Another criticism was raised by Comaroff and Roberts (1981), who argued 
that the rules consisted of a loosely constructed repertoire rather than an in-
ternally consistent code and could not be reduced to formalistic models. The 
rules of property relations, for example, may always be construed in a variety 
of culturally recognized ways and may repeatedly be revised to express con-
temporary interests or relations. Similarly, as Moore (1986) wrote of the 
Chagga, “customary” practices changed freely in response to the social and 
economic transformation without any explicit revision of the stated custom-
ary law. The new norms and patterns of behavior that emerged under new 
conditions were simply incorporated as part of the system of practice. Moore 
summarized that the Chagga used “their traditions as one of a number of re-
sources out of which to construct new arrangements to suit their ever-chang-
ing situations” (Moore 1986, p. 319).
From a different perspective, Chanock (1985) argued that customary law 
was a product created in the process of the transformation in African institu-
tions under colonialism. Customary law played a role in the legitimizing of 
power on the local level as British colonial policies sought to support a par-
ticular rural power structure in the name of tradition. In this process Africans 
were the active and strategic users, not the passive recipients, of the custom-
ary law that were created to deal with the new situation of the colonized 
world and to translate their values and interests into power over others. Codi-
fication of customary law, Chanock maintained, transformed previously fluid 
and flexible custom into fixed rules and led to a freezing of rural status and 
stratification, henceforth defined and not negotiated. This last point, however, 
was later challenged by other scholars (Berry 1993; Shadle 1999), who argued 
that the same process resulted in a series of ongoing debates and perpetual 
contest over the rules, and that customary law remained fluid.
These theoretical perspectives on customary law in Africa have been re-
flected, though in varied degrees, in the existing studies of contemporary land 
tenure in Malawi (Mkandawire 1984; Peters 1997, 2002; Peters and Kambewa 
2007; Kishindo 1997, 2006). With this previous scholarship in mind, this 
chapter contributes to the current debates on the contemporary dynamics of 
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customary land tenure in Malawi and in rural Africa at large in the following 
ways. First it sheds light on the debates over whether the contemporary dy-
namics of land rights in rural Africa lead to adaptive and negotiable customary 
systems of landholding or to a growing inequality and social differentiation. 
An influential work by Sara Berry (1993) interprets African rural land as be-
ing subject to multiple interests and to a dynamic of litigation and struggle 
that both fosters investment in social relations and helps keep them fluid and 
negotiable. Peters (2004a), on the other hand, argues that more attention is 
needed on the instances of intensifying conflict over land. While acknowl-
edging the adaptive and negotiable nature of customary tenure, Peters main-
tains that it is only part of the story, emphasizing the processes of competition, 
exclusion, and inequality and social differentiation associated with the prolif-
eration of incidents of conflict over land. The increasing incidents of conflict 
over land, Peters argues, belie “the assumption that socially embedded sys-
tems of landholding and land use guarantee access, let alone equal access” 
(Peters 2004a, p. 305). Using detailed case materials of actual land transac-
tions, this chapter examines the relevance of these arguments in the case of 
rural Malawi.
The second contribution is in clarifying the extent of the development of 
the market-based transaction of land rights. Chimhowu and Woodhouse 
(2006) argue that the commoditization of access to land within the framework 
of customary tenure, which they call “vernacular land markets,” is now more 
common than in the past. The principal factors driving the vernacular land 
markets include increasing commercialization of agricultural produce and the 
mobility of labor that has generated cash flows and increased the value of 
land. Chimhowu and Woodhouse also suggest that commoditization of land 
inevitably works to the disadvantage of those with lower purchasing power 
and that those with the most influence over land under customary tenure (such 
as village heads and lineage heads) are best placed to gain from land sales and 
rents. This argument echoes Peters’s emphasis on the inequality and social 
differentiation associated with the contemporary dynamics of land rights 
(Peters 2004a). This chapter examines the extent to which these arguments 
about vernacular land markets are supported by the empirical evidence from 
a number of locations across rural Malawi.
2.2 Customary Land Tenure and Inheritance Rules in Malawi
Land in Malawi can be classified into three categories: public, private, and 
customary land (Kishindo 2004). Public land is owned or held in trust by the 
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government or Traditional Authorities. This category includes such areas as 
national parks, forest reserves, and conservation areas. Private land is held or 
owned under freehold title, leasehold title, or Certificate of Claim granted by 
early colonial governors to European settlers. Most large-scale estates fall 
under this third category of private land. Customary land is held under the 
customary law of each ethnic group and makes up 69 percent of total land in 
Malawi (Government of Malawi 2001). As most of the land cultivated by 
smallholder farmers falls under this category, the following analysis focuses 
exclusively on customary land.
Rights to customary land are regarded as held by the community as a 
whole.3 Local chiefs exercise trusteeship over land on behalf of the people in 
the area. Village heads are entrusted with the management of the land within 
their territory and make decisions regarding land allocation to community 
members. Every indigenous inhabitant, by virtue of membership in a com-
munity, is entitled to access to a piece of land. Nonindigenous inhabitants 
such as migrants may also be allocated a piece of land, provided that vacant 
land is available and the recipients respect community tradition and customs. 
Once acquired, the right to the land can be handed over to one’s heirs on a 
quasi-permanent basis. However, when a landholder and his or her kin mem-
bers all die or move out of the village, the land must be returned to the com-
munity for reallocations to other community members. As land is not owned 
as such but is vested in the community as a whole, the permanent alienation 
of land (such as through sale) is usually prohibited (Government of Malawi 
1999, p. 63). In reality, however, several cases of land sales were observed in 
the study villages.
The transfer of land rights within a lineage through gifting and inheritance4 
follows matrilineal or patrilineal rules, depending on the kinship organization 
of an ethnic group. Matrilineal kinship organizations are predominant in the 
major ethnic groups of central and southern Malawi, such as the Chewa, Yao, 
and Lomwe, and within these groups land is transferred along matrilineal 
lines. Patrilineal rules, on the other hand, are practiced among the major ethnic 
groups in northern Malawi, particularly among the Tumbuka and Ngoni. In 
these societies land rights belong to the men, and are transferred mostly from 
fathers to sons. In both matrilineal and patrilineal societies, land is gifted to 
an heir when the heir gets married, gives birth to a baby, or becomes mature 
enough to form an independent household. Inheritance of land also follows 
matrilineal or patrilineal rules, but the decision of who inherits the land of a 
deceased is made by a lineage head based on consultation with lineage mem-
bers. In both gifting and inheritance, preference is given to those who reside 
in their natal village over those who reside elsewhere.
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Matrilineal and patrilineal social organizations are closely linked to mar-
riage and residence rules. In matrilineal societies, uxorilocal residence in 
which a husband moves to the wife’s village and cultivates her land is the 
norm. A husband has no decision-making power on the transfer of the wife’s 
land rights. Upon divorce or wife’s death, a husband is expected to return to 
his natal village and lose the use rights to the land in his wife’s village. Chil-
dren remain in their mother’s village because they belong to the mother’s 
matrilineal kin (Kishindo 1995; Peters 1999, 2002; Mkandawire 1984).5 
Rules of residence in patrilineal societies, on the other hand, are virilocal in 
which a wife lives in her husband’s village after marriage. A legitimate mar-
riage in patrilineal societies involves a payment of bridewealth (lobola) from 
a husband to the wife’s kin. A divorced woman must go back to her village, 
leaving her children to the husband’s village and returning the bridewealth to 
the husband’s kin (Read 1956). A widow may remain in her late husband’s 
village and continue cultivating his land together with their children, provided 
that the bridewealth was paid upon marriage. If no bridewealth was paid upon 
marriage (which has become increasingly common in recent years), a divorced 
woman or a widow may take her children back to her natal village. The return 
of a man or woman to his/her village after a divorce or spouse’s death may 
cause a land dispute among kin members because the allocation of land to the 
returnee is likely to be difficult due to the severe scarcity of land in many 
parts of rural Malawi (Peters 2002; Kishindo 1997).
2.3 Actual Land Transactions in the Study Villages
The indigenous land tenure systems and matrilineal and patrilineal inheritance 
rules described above are better regarded as “ideal constructs” (Phiri 1983, p. 
258).6 It should not be supposed that, both in the past and present, all land 
transactions follow these idealized models of customary land tenure (Chim-
howu and Woodhouse 2006). As the following section will show, the actual 
land transactions observed in the study villages were more complex and flex-
ible than the general rules summarized above. Also observed were many ex-
ceptions to the inheritance rules, such as land gifts from father to son in 
matrilineal societies. Nevertheless, we should not jump to the conclusion of 
an evolutionary, uni-directional increase in patriliny (Brantley 1997; Guyer 
1981). The more important issue here is to understand in what circumstances 
such exceptions occur, and why flexible application of inheritance rules are 
used in some cases while in other cases they are rigidly applied. By examin-
ing the cases of actual land transactions in both matrilineal and patrilineal 
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societies in the six study villages, the following section seeks to clarify the 
complex interplay of indigenous institutions and the villagers’ struggle for 
land.
2.3.1 Land Rights in Matrilineal Societies
Among the six villages studied, people in Kachamba and Horo follow 
matrilineal rules of inheritance. As can be seen in Table 2.1 which summa-
rizes the methods and sources of land acquisitions in the study villages, the 
majority of residents in the two villages obtained land rights through matrilin-
eal lines. It is noteworthy, however, that in a good number of cases villagers 
obtained land from sources other than matrilineal lines, indicating a flexible 
application of the inheritance rules. On the other hand, as will be shown in the 
case of Horo below, very rigid applications of matrilineal inheritance rules 
were also found. Behind this seemingly paradoxical coexistence of both flex-
ible and rigid application of inheritance rules lies the growing problem of 
land scarcity in the two villages.
(1) Kachamba
The Kachamba area was first inhabited in 1953 by a group of Chewa matri-
lineal kin members who migrated from a village in the adjacent TA Mlonyeni. 
The group was led by a senior brother who had obtained vacant land in the 
present Kachamba area from a local chief. The senior brother divided the land 
and distributed it among his kin.7 Most residents of Kachamba are descen-
dants of the original settlers and obtained their land as a gift or by inheritance 
(Figure 2.1). In the past, when land was abundant, villagers sought permis-
sion from the village headman and opened farms on uncultivated areas. At the 
time of the survey, however, no extra land was available, and acquisition 
through gifting and inheritance was the most important means of obtaining 
access to land.
In Kachamba 30 households (97 percent) cultivated their own land. The 
average household landholding size was 0.88 ha, and the average farm size 
(including rented land) was 1.10 ha. As Table 2.2 shows, 26 percent of house-
holds operated very small farms of less than 0.5 ha. Only one female-headed 
household did not hold land (it was renting land). Among the landholding 
households, there were 15 cases in which the land belonged to male household 
members, and 11 in which the land belonged to female members. In the re-
maining 4 cases, both male and female household members (husband and 
wife) had separate plots of land.
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TABLE 2.1   Methods and Sources of Land Acquisition Observed in the Study Villages
Kachamba Belo Horo Bongololo Mulawa
Dominant ethnic group and inheritance rule Chewa (Matrilineal) Mixed Lomwe (Matrilineal) Tumbuka (Patrilineal) Ngoni (Patrilineal)
No. of sample households 31 30 32 33 28
Method Matrilineal/
Patrilineal
Source Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Gifting Matrilineal Mother 10 5 15 1 1 2 10 13 23 0 1 1 0 0 0
Maternal uncle 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
Maternal grandmother 0 3 3 0 0 0 3 4 7 0 0 0 1 0 1
Uterine sibling 0 1 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maternal aunt 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Matrilineal total 10 9 19 4 1 5 14 18 32 0 2 2 2 0 2
Patrilineal Father 8 2 10 3 4 7 1 5 6 14 2 16 21 1 22
Paternal uncle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Agnate sibling 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 1
Patrilineal total 8 2 10 3 4 7 1 5 6 15 4 19 21 2 23
Other Husband 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maternal grandfather 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Stepmother 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brother of maternal grandfather 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other total 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Gifting total 18 11 29 7 7 14 15 24 39 16 6 22 23 2 25
Inheritance Matrilineal Mother 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0
Maternal aunt 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maternal grandmother 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sister of maternal grandmother 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Daughter of maternal 
grandmother’s sister 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Matrilineal total 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0
Patrilineal Father 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 2 4 0 0 0
Other Husband 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 3 3
Inheritance total 1 2 3 0 2 2 2 3 5 2 6 8 0 3 3
Matrilineal inheritance and gifting total 11 11 22 4 1 5 14 20 34 0 3 3 2 0 2
Patrilineal inheritance and gifting total 8 2 10 3 4 7 3 6 9 17 6 23 21 2 23
Other inheritance and gifting total 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 1 1 1 3 4 0 3 3
Other methods Allocation by village head 0 0 0 14 4 18 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0
Purchase 3 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other methods total 3 0 3 14 4 18 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 
Grand total 22 13 35 21 13 34 18 27 45 20 12 32 23 5 28 
Rented/
Borrowed
Rented land 5 1 6 0 0 0 1 2 3 7 0 7 0 0 0
Borrowed land (free of charge) 4 0 4 5 1 6 1 0 1 7 2 9 1 1 2
Rented/Borrowed total 9 1 10 5 1 6 2 2 4 14 2 16 1 1 2 
Notes: 1. Figures for Kachamba do not include those for original settlers.
 2. Total number of cases exceeds that of the sampled households because a household                                                    may have obtained land from multiple sources through different methods.
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TABLE 2.1   (Continued)
Mbila
Total
Dominant ethnic group and inheritance rule Mixed
No. of sample households 32 186
Method Matrilineal/
Patrilineal
Source Male Female Total Male Female Total
Gifting Matrilineal Mother 0 2 2 21 22 43
Maternal uncle 1 0 1 3 2 5
Maternal grandmother 2 0 2 6 7 13
Uterine sibling 1 0 1 3 1 4
Maternal aunt 0 0 0 1 0 1
Matrilineal total 4 2 6 34 32 66
Patrilineal Father 10 3 13 57 17 74
Paternal uncle 0 0 0 0 1 1
Agnate sibling 0 0 0 1 2 3
Patrilineal total 10 3 13 58 20 78
Other Husband 0 0 0 0 1 1
Maternal grandfather 1 0 1 2 1 3
Stepmother 0 0 0 0 1 1
Brother of maternal grandfather 0 1 1 0 1 1
Other total 1 1 2 2 4 6
Gifting total 15 6 21 94 56 150
Inheritance Matrilineal Mother 0 0 0 0 3 3
Maternal aunt 0 0 0 0 1 1
Maternal grandmother 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sister of maternal grandmother 0 0 0 0 1 1
Daughter of maternal 
grandmother’s sister 0 0 0
1 0 1
Matrilineal total 0 0 0 1 5 6
Patrilineal Father 1 0 1 5 3 8
Other Husband 0 2 2 0 10 10
Inheritance total 1 2 3 6 18 24
Matrilineal inheritance and gifting total 4 2 6 35 37 72
Patrilineal inheritance and gifting total 11 3 14 63 23 86
Other inheritance and gifting total 1 3 4 2 14 16
Other methods Allocation by village head 6 0 6 22 4 26
Purchase 2 0 2 6 0 6
Other methods total 8 0 8 28 4 32 
Grand total 24 8 32 128 78 206 
Rented/
Borrowed
Rented land 2 0 2 14 2 18
Borrowed land (free of charge) 2 0 2 20 4 24
Rented/Borrowed total 4 0 4 34 6 42 
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The Chewa people follow matrilineal rules of descent and inheritance in 
which land is passed down through matrilines, most commonly from female 
landholders to female heirs (Mkandawire 1992; Kishindo 2004). In Ka-
chamba, however, both men and women obtained their land matrilineally and 
patrilineally. As shown in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1, in the majority of cases 
(22 out of 32 total cases), land rights were obtained from matrilineal kin 
members, although land transfers from mother to daughter were not many 
(only 5 cases). On the other hand, there were 10 cases in which sons and 
daughters received land from fathers, contrary to matrilineal inheritance 
rules.8 The rule of matrilineal inheritance in Kachamba, therefore, was not 
rigid, but flexible.
A similar flexibility was observed in the rules of residency after marriage. 
Among matrilineal societies in Malawi, marriages are usually uxorilocal. In 
Kachamba, however, cases of virilocal marriage were more common (16 
cases) than uxorilocal marriage (5 cases). Generally, those who had obtained 
land before marriage or who could be given land upon marriage tended to 
remain in Kachamba after marriage.
The flexible practice of inheritance and marriage rules in Kachamba may 
be an adaptive strategy employed by villagers in response to the increasing 
scarcity of land. As acquisition of land became more difficult, villagers sought 
land from any source, whether matrilineally or patrilineally. Once they ob-
tained land, men continued to stay in the village after marriage (contrary to 
the rule of uxorilocal marriage) to secure their land right. While staying in 
Kachamba after marriage and using their own land, some male villagers cul-
tivated additional land belonging to wives who came from nearby villages. 
Four such cases were found, and their average landholding (husband’s land 
plus wife’s land) was 39 percent larger than the average landholding of a 
husband only.9 Because landholdings became smaller as the land was divided 
TABLE 2.2   Ratio of Households by Farm Size in the Study Villages
Total farm size*
Kachamba
(n = 31)
(%)
Belo
(n = 30)
(%)
Horo
(n = 32)
(%)
Bongololo
(n = 33)
(%)
Mulawa
(n = 28)
(%)
Mbila
(n = 32)
(%)
Total
(n = 186)
(%)
None
< 0.5 ha
0.5–1.0 ha
1.0–1.5 ha
1.5–2.0 ha
More than 2.0 ha
0
26
39
19
10
6
0
7
17
27
27
23
0
50
38
6
6
0
0
27
48
15
6
3
0
29
14
29
18
11
0
22
41
25
6
6
0
27
33
20
12
8
      Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
* Including rent-in land.
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among descendants upon transfer, obtaining land from sources other than 
one’s own village, such as from a wife’s village, appeared to be an important 
means of increasing farm size. By altering local institutions, villagers coped 
with the increased land pressure and difficulties in land acquisition.
(2) Horo
Most residents in Horo were matrilineal Lomwe. They were descendents of 
migrants who originally came from Mozambique in the first half of the twen-
tieth century. At that time there was a massive migration of Lomwe people 
who fled to the Nyasaland territory to escape the oppression of Portuguese 
rule in Mozambique. Some of the Lomwe migrants were absorbed as farm 
laborers into the large European settler estates in southern Nyasaland. Others 
settled onto unoccupied land and formed new villages, and Horo was one 
such village. The present-day residents in Horo were the third or fourth gen-
eration of the original settlers. Due to population increase, there was no un-
cultivated land left for new allocation at the time of the survey. The acquisition 
of land rights of the sample households in Horo were mostly through gifting 
and inheritance (Table 2.1).
The Lomwe people follow matrilineal inheritance rules. However, land 
held by male landholders among the first-generation migrants (who obtained 
land rights by opening new farms on unoccupied land) tended to be inherited 
or gifted to their children if other matrilineal kin members did not reside in 
their village. When land was transferred to the next generation, it was divided 
into pieces to ensure all legitimate heirs received land. This practice often 
resulted in the situation where individual landholdings became smaller as the 
generations proceeded. In the case shown in Figure 2.2, for example, the land 
held by an original migrant had been divided into small pieces that were held 
by 13 descendents at the time of the survey. As a consequence of such subdi-
vision of land, the average farm size of the sample households in Horo was 
only 0.58 ha, the smallest in the six study villages. Half of the sample house-
holds in Horo cultivated less than 0.5 ha.
Sources and methods of land acquisition in Horo show some similarities 
with those in Kachamba. First, although the majority of land acquisition 
cases were from matrilineal kin members, there were 10 cases (23 percent) in 
which plots of land were acquired through non-matrilineal lines. Second, land 
transfer from mother to daughter was not always the norm. Landholders in-
cluded both women and men, and it is noteworthy that there were 10 cases in 
which men obtained land from their mothers. As was the case in Kachamba, 
matrilineal inheritance rules were not rigidly applied to actual land transac-
tions in Horo.
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The existence of flexible applications of inheritance rules does not neces-
sarily mean that matrilineal inheritance is weakening. On the contrary, there 
were some cases in which flexible application was counterchecked by a rigid 
application of matrilineal inheritance rules, as the following two cases illus-
trate.
Case 1: When JT, a 34-year-old woman in Horo, was living with her mother, 
they were cultivating a piece of land that had been allocated by the father of 
JT’s mother. When JT’s mother died, however, the land was taken by matri-
lineal kin of the mother’s father, and JT could not inherit the land and lost her 
cultivation right on it. As a divorced woman with five young children, JT did 
not hold her own land at the time of the survey. She had borrowed a very 
small piece of land (0.14 ha) from her stepmother to cultivate maize.
Case 2: In the case shown in Figure 2.2, when a female kin member, B, died, 
her land was inherited by her uterine brother, C, in accordance with matrilin-
eal inheritance rules. In 2003, C gifted the land to his daughter, D. However, 
this land gift was challenged by other kin members because D did not belong 
to the matrilineal kin group. After some discussion among kin members, it 
was decided that from 2005 the land should be given to one of E’s children, 
who is a matrilineal kin member of the original landholder.
In both cases, land transfer from a man to his child or grandchild was 
counterchecked by his matrilineal kin. Under the situation of increasing land 
shortage in the area, individuals sought to obtain land rights from any source, 
including non-matrilineal kin members such as father or grandfather. On the 
other hand, the same land shortage induced matrilineal kin groups to counter-
check the practice of flexible land transfer to prevent their lineage land from 
being alienated to non-kin members. Thus, coexistence of both flexible and 
rigid applications of inheritance rules under land scarce situations represent 
the conflict between the individual struggling for land rights and the lineage 
seeking to protect land from alienation.10
2.3.2 Land Rights in Patrilineal Societies
Villagers in Bongololo and Mulawa follow patrilineal inheritance rules in 
which land is transferred through patrilineal lines, mostly from father to son. 
Most of the land gifts and inheritances observed in the sample households in 
the two villages were patrilineal (Table 2.1), but there were also some excep-
tions. The following section examines the cases in which land was not trans-
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ferred patrilineally, revealing that inheritance rules were applied flexibly to 
accommodate various individual situations.
(1) Bongololo
The average farm size of the sample households in Bongololo was 0.80 ha, 
and 27 percent of the sample households cultivated less than 0.5 ha (Table 
2.2). At the time of the survey, there was little uncultivated land left for new 
allocation and most households obtained their land rights through gifting or 
inheritance.11 Land sales were not allowed in Bongololo but land rental was 
permitted.
Residents of the village were mostly patrilineal Tumbuka.12 Among the 
sample households, instances of land acquisition from patrilineal kin mem-
bers accounted for 77 percent (23 cases) of the total. On the other hand, there 
were seven cases13 in which plots of land were obtained from somebody 
other than one’s patrilineal kin group. Two such cases are examined below to 
clarify the reasons for non-patrilineal inheritance and gifting of land. In both 
cases the existence of strong relationships between original landholders and 
heirs led to the non-patrilineal land transfer.
Case 3: GG, a 25-year-old man in Bongololo, received a piece of land from 
his mother’s father, MG (a person who is not GG’s patrilineal kin). As is 
shown in Figure 2.3, this was the only non-patrilineal land transfer in the 
family, and all other land transfers followed patrilineal inheritance rules. The 
following life history of GG explains why the non-patrilineal land transfer 
occurred.
GG’s mother was born in Bongololo but moved to the district capital of 
Mzimba when her father, MG, found a job there. However, she died in 
Mzimba after giving birth to two babies, one being GG. Thereafter, MG took 
care of the two babies, and when he returned to Bongololo, MG also brought 
the two young children along to the village. GG and his younger brother grew 
up in MG’s house in Bongololo, and when GG got married in 1999, he was 
gifted with a piece of land from MG.
The above life history of GG explains the reason for the non-patrilineal 
land transfer; although GG and MG did not belong to the same patrilineal kin, 
their relationship in everyday life made them very close to that of real kin. In 
fact, GG put up his house next to that of MG and MG’s patrilineal kin mem-
bers, and lived as if he were a member of the kin group. The non-patrilineal 
land transfer from MG to GG was made possible under this situation of 
“quasi-kin relationship” between the two.
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Case 4 (Figure 2.4):14 A similar non-patrilineal land transfer based on a quasi-
kin relationship was found in the case of CN, a 37-year-old man who obtained 
land from his father’s uterine brother, SM. Most of the land that SM (who was 
79 years old at the time of the survey) obtained from his late father was gifted 
to SM’s sons, following the patrilineal inheritance rules. However, a portion 
of land was also given to CN, who was not a patrilineal kin member. The 
following family histories explain the non-patrilineal land transfer.
When SM was still young, his father died and his widowed mother soon 
remarried and gave birth to N, CN’s father. SM and N were uterine brothers 
and they grew up together. Later they put up their houses next to each other, 
and SM was a part of CN’s life from the latter’s childhood. Although, strictly 
speaking, SM and CN belonged to different patrilineal kin groups, their rela-
tionship was clearly much more than that of mere neighbors. This strong 
personal relationship was the reason behind the non-patrilineal gifting of 
land.
Village head
GG
: Offspring : Spouse : Sibling
: male,  ?: female, ???: deceased,  ??? ?: living outside village
MG
Land transfer through gifting
Land transfer through inheritance
Patrilineal kin group
Fig. 2.3   Non-patrilineal Land Transfer in Bongololo (Case 3)
Note: The non-patrilineal land transfer discussed in the main text is indicated in bold type.
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(2) Mulawa
Mulawa is a patrilineal Ngoni village. Most residents in Mulawa are the 
descendents of an Ngoni migrant who came from a village north of Mzimba 
and settled in what was then an uninhabited area in the first half of the twen-
tieth century. At the time of the survey, population pressure on the land was 
not very keen in Mulawa as it was in the three villages discussed above. This 
was reflected in the fact that the average household farm size in Mulawa was 
1.18 hectare, twice as much as that in Horo.
Methods and sources of land acquisition in Mulawa (Table 2.1) showed 
similar characteristics with those in Bongololo. First, most cases (82 percent) 
of land gifting and inheritance followed patrilineal inheritance rules. Second, 
there were a few cases in which land rights were obtained through non-patri-
lineal lines. It is noteworthy that, again, strong personal ties between land-
holders and heirs explain the non-patrilineal land transfers, as the following 
two cases illustrate.
Case 5 (Figure 2.5): BM’s mother was born in Mulawa but moved to her 
Fig. 2.4   Non-patrilineal Land Transfer in Bongololo (Case 4)
Note: The non-patrilineal land transfer discussed in the main text is indicated in bold type.
Village head
CN
Patrilineal kin group
: Offspring : Spouse : Sibling
Land transfer through gifting
Land transfer through inheritance
?: male,  ?: female, ???: deceased,    ? ?? ?: living outside village
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husband’s village in Zambia when she married. Later she gave birth to BM in 
Zambia, but soon divorced and came back to Mulawa with BM. The mother 
died when BM was only five years old. Thereafter, BM grew up under the 
care of his mother’s brother. When BM got married in 1992, he received a 
0.64 ha piece of land from the maternal uncle. The maternal uncle had two 
sons, who also received land from their father.
Case 6 (Figure 2.5): CB’s mother was also born in Mulawa, moved to her 
husband’s village when married, but came back to Mulawa after the death of 
her husband. At the time of returning to Mulawa she was pregnant, and soon 
gave birth to CB. CB and his mother lived with his maternal grandparents in 
Mulawa. Later his grandfather died; then his own mother died, and thereafter 
CB lived with his grandmother who inherited her late husband’s plot of land. 
When CB grew up, the grandmother gifted her late husband’s land to CB.
The four cases in Bongololo and Mulawa described above indicate the two 
conditions under which a non-patrilineal land transfer can occur. One is where 
a person who, for reasons unique to his or her individual life history, has no 
Fig. 2.5   Directions of Land Transfers in Mulawa (Cases 5 and 6)
Note: The non-patrilineal land transfers in Cases 5 and 6 discussed in the main text are 
indicated in bold type.
Original settler
Village head
Land transfer through gifting
Land transfer through inheritance
Patrilineal kin group
: Offspring : Spouse : Sibling
BMCB
?:?male, ??:?female, ???: deceased, ?? ???? : living outside village?
, ,
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contact with patrilineal kin members who, under normal conditions, should 
be the sources of land acquisition. The other is where an original landholder 
and an heir develop a strong relationship, like that of a foster parent and child, 
which legitimizes a land transfer that does not follow patrilineal inheritance 
rules. Although patrilineal inheritance was practiced in the majority of cases 
in the two villages, the rules were flexibly applied under the two above condi-
tions so as to accommodate individual circumstances. This fact echoes the 
observation made by Moore and Vaughan (1994, p. 210) in northern Zambia 
that rights regarding land are “historically determined, often being bound up 
with the biography of particular individuals.”
2.3.3 Land Rights in a Multi-Ethnic Community: Mbila
Mbila is a multiethnic community where the majority of residents (72 per-
cent at the time of the survey) are indigenous, matrilineal Chewa, while 
patrilineal Tumbuka and Ngoni also accounted for a sizable part of the popu-
lation (20 percent when the survey was taken). The village is located close to 
the border between the Central Region (where the population is predomi-
nantly matrilineal) and the Northern Region (which is patrilineal), and this 
partly explains the multiethnic component.
As was the case in Kachamba, uxorilocal marriage was not strictly practiced 
among the Chewa in Mbila. Both uxorilocal and virilocal marriage were ob-
served, as the case below illustrates.
Case 7 (Figure 2.6): SD is a Chewa man who was born in Zambia and moved 
to Mbila in 1983 when he married a Chewa woman in the village (uxorilocal 
marriage). In the next year, he and his wife were allocated a piece of land by 
the village headman. At the time of the survey, parts of this land were gifted 
to his three sons and one daughter who were all married. The wives of the 
three sons had all moved to Mbila upon marriage (virilocal marriages) while 
the husband of SD’s daughter had moved to wife’s village (uxorilocal mar-
riage).
Similarly, matrilineal inheritance rules were not strictly followed among 
the Chewa in Mbila. As Table 2.3 shows, the number of cases in which land 
rights were obtained from matrilineal kin was less than that from other 
sources. Thus matrilineal inheritance and uxorilocal marriage were not the 
norm among the Chewa in this village. On the other hand, the sources of land 
acquisition in all four cases of land gifting and inheritance among Tumbuka 
and Ngoni households were fathers.
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Fig. 2.6   Coexistence of Uxorilocal and Virilocal Marriages (Case 7)
Village head
Uxorilocal marriage
SD
Land transfer through gifting
Land transfer through inheritance
Virilocal
marriage
Uxorilocal
marriage
Virilocal
marriage
Virilocal
marriage
: Offspring : Spouse : Sibling
: male,??: female, ??: deceased,  ??? ???: living outside village
, ,
2.3.4 A Land Abundant Migrant Community: Belo
Belo belongs to the TA Mponda and used to be a small indigenous Yao 
community until the 1980s. However, at the time of the survey in 2004, the 
majority of Belo residents were migrants who had settled in the village since 
the 1980s (Table 2.4). Thirty-six percent of the household heads in Belo came 
from other villages within the Mangochi District or from the adjacent Ntcheu, 
TABLE 2.3   Sources of Land Acquisition among the Chewa in Mbila
Source No. of Cases
Matrilineal:
Mother 2
Maternal grandmother 2
Uterine sibling 1
Maternal uncle 1
Total 6
Other:
Father 10
Husband 2
Allocation by village head 3
Purchase 2
Total 17
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Balaka, and Machinga Districts. It is noteworthy that many of the migrants 
(41 percent) came from the land-scarce areas of the Southern Region such as 
the Zomba, Mulanje, and Thyolo Districts. This provides micro-level evi-
dence of increasing rural-rural migration driven by land shortage, as discussed 
by Potts (2006).
In fact, the main reason for the migration to Belo appeared to be the avail-
ability of land in the area. During the interviews, most migrants made clear 
that they had come to Belo in order to obtain land. Upon arrival at Belo, mi-
grants were given portions of land by the village headman. No payment was 
made when land was allocated to the migrants, although some expressed their 
appreciation to the headman by giving gifts such as chickens, maize, or cash. 
After receiving the land, migrants were free to transfer land rights to relatives. 
However, transfer of land to strangers was not permitted.
When migrants (and their relatives) leave Belo, their lands must be sur-
rendered to the village headman for reallocation to others, in accordance with 
customary land tenure. As migrants who recently came to the village from 
various parts of Malawi, many of Belo’s residents did not have relatives in the 
village. Leaving the village after some years therefore means abandoning the 
rights to the land, and a migrant’s labor and capital investment in the land 
going for naught. The following case shows one strategy that migrants in 
Belo adopted to retain control of their land even after they have left the vil-
lage.
Case 8: OJ, a 28-year-old Yao man, settled in Belo in 1996 after being asked 
by his maternal uncle to come to Belo and take over the land which the uncle 
had obtained in 1990 from the village headman. When the uncle returned to 
his natal village for some undisclosed reason in 1996, he was farming land as 
well as holding as yet unopened land in Belo, but he had no relatives there to 
TABLE 2.4   Year of Migration into Belo of Household Head
No. of Households (%)
1985 or before 10 (9)
1986–90 27 (23)
1990–95 15 (13)
1996–2000 22 (19)
2001 or later 26 (23)
Unknown 5 (4)
Total migrant households 105 (91)
Total indigenous households 10 (9)
Total Belo households 115 (100)
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take over the land, which meant that the land would be reallocated to some-
body else after he left. To keep the land rights even after he left Belo, the 
uncle decided to invite OJ, a legitimate heir, to come and continue cultivating 
the land. At the time of the survey, OJ was cultivating 1.2 ha of land and was 
still expanding the farm.
In contrast to the general scarcity of land in the other study villages, land 
was still readily available in Belo at the time of the survey. The size distribu-
tion of farms in the study villages (Table 2.2) clearly shows the relative 
abundance of land in Belo. The remote location of the village delayed the 
inflow of population into the Belo area,15 and most residents at the time of the 
survey were first-generation migrants. They were still in the process of ex-
panding farms on the allocated land, and the subdivision of land through 
gifting and inheritance to the next generation (as was observed in other study 
villages) was yet to occur.
The abundance of uncultivated land in Belo often caused boundary dis-
putes. Many Belo residents still had parts on their land unopened. As the 
boundaries of the allocated land were not always clearly defined, some farm-
ers claimed “invasion” of their land by others. This was most likely to happen 
when an unused part of one farmer’s land lay along side land being cultivated 
by another farmer. To avoid invasions, some farmers began cultivating plots 
along the boundaries of their land. Their strategy was to avoid impingement 
of their land rights by clearly demonstrating the results of their labor inputs 
on the land. The following case illustrates such strategy.
Case 9: LL was once a farm laborer on an estate near Lilongwe. In 1988 he 
migrated to Belo to obtain land there and soon was allocated land by the vil-
lage headman. Because LL was one of the early migrants who settled in Belo, 
unoccupied land was abundant in the village. He, therefore, received a large 
tract of land from the village head which enabled LL to distribute lands to his 
seven children and six relatives. Even after this distribution, many parts of his 
allocated land were still unopened at the time of the survey.
In 2003 a migrant put up a house, without LL’s consent, on an unopened 
part of LL’s land, and started opening a new farm there. The migrant claimed 
that he had been allocated the land by a village headman under the adjacent 
TA Nankumba. This happened because the border of the land between the two 
Traditional Authorities was not clearly demarcated, and the two village headmen 
under different TAs allocated the same land to two households. LL did not 
openly challenge the claim of the newcomer, but ordered his children to open 
up new farms along the border area of his land to prevent further impingement.
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The strategy of opening new plots to prevent impingement of land was only 
possible under the land abundant situation in Belo. In other study villages 
where unopened land was hardly available due to land scarcity, problems of 
impingement rarely occurred because every villager clearly recognized the 
boundaries of every plot of land. Similarly, the strategy of inviting a legitimate 
heir to the village to prevent land alienation, seen in Case 8, is peculiar to 
Belo. The strategy was adopted in a situation where the majority of house-
holds were first-generation migrants who had to look for a legitimate heir 
who could assume the land rights. In other study villages, and probably in 
most rural areas in Malawi, it is easy to find legitimate heirs in the same vil-
lage. The problem is usually not the absence of legitimate heirs as in the case 
of Belo, but too many of them for a small piece of land as in Horo. However, 
it seems highly likely that within a few decades Belo residents will also expe-
rience a similar population increase and subdivision of land that will lead to 
an intensifying struggle for land among villagers.
2.4 Vernacular Land Market
Contrary to the customary prohibition against outright sales of land, some 
cases of land acquisition by purchase were found in Kachamba (three cases), 
Horo (one case), and Mbila (two cases). In one case in Mbila, a migrant who 
worked on a large commercial farm for 12 years purchased a 2.4 ha piece of 
land from the village headman in 1999 and settled in the village. In another 
case in Mbila, a soldier from another area purchased a piece of land of about 
7 ha from a relative of the village head in 1998, and a written agreement on 
the land sale was prepared in the presence of the village head. In Kachamba 
and Horo, on the other hand, most land buyers were resident farmers who 
wished to expand their farms. Overall, purchases in five out of the six cases 
were made in the last 10 years16 and the transactions were authorized by the 
village heads. These facts suggest that the land sales have been taking place 
relatively recently, with the “official” approval of the village heads despite 
the customary prohibition in theory. One such case in Kachamba is described 
below.
Case 10: YK was a 35-year-old man in Kachamba who had a brother and a 
sister in the same village. All of them were married and had formed indepen-
dent households. YK’s widowed mother had a 2 ha piece of land, from which 
she gave a 1.5 ha piece to YK’s brother. She kept the remaining 0.5 ha for 
herself. YK therefore had to seek other sources to acquire land. He first bor-
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rowed a 0.5 ha piece of land free of charge from his maternal grandfather in 
1996. In 1998, he purchased a 1.2 ha piece of land from somebody in a 
nearby village for US$145. Upon purchase, he and the seller prepared a writ-
ten document certifying the sale. They also reported to the group village 
headman about the sale and gave a goat to him to show their appreciation of 
his approval.
The cases of land purchase in the villages studied generally support the 
argument of Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006), who maintain that the ver-
nacular land market has been gaining momentum in recent years. The cases 
also echo their assertion that people try to reinforce the legitimacy of land 
rights acquired in the vernacular markets through various means, such as the 
preparation of written documentation and the approval from authorities. In 
addition, the types of land buyers observed in the villages studied correspond 
to those identified by Chimhowu and Woodhouse: migrants who lack custom-
ary land rights; bureaucrats and politicians who have enough income earned 
from full-time jobs to invest in land; and indigenous residents who have ac-
cess to customary land rights but are forced to resort to land purchases because 
of the increasing problem of land scarcity (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006, 
pp. 357–58).
The lands purchased in the villages studied were relatively large, and the 
land buyers appeared to be wealthy. The amount of land purchased in the past 
10 years ranged from 0.41 to 7 ha, and their average was 2.4 ha.17 Given that 
the average farm size per household in the sample was 1.0 ha, the sizes of 
land obtained through purchase were much larger than those obtained through 
the customary transaction of gifts and inheritance. All land buyers were men 
and either had a regular salaried job or were from relatively wealthier house-
holds or both. When household income per adult equivalent was calculated, 
four of the land buyers belonged to the top income quartile.18 These facts 
suggest that it is the upper stratum of the population that is most likely to be 
able to obtain a large tract of land or expand their landholdings through pur-
chase. This fact partly supports the argument of Peters (2004a) and Chimhowu 
and Woodhouse (2006) that the contemporary dynamics of customary land 
rights and the emerging vernacular land markets result in increased inequali-
ties.
In contrast to the cases of land purchase, land rental markets were used by 
a diverse range of farmers. The size of land rented was much smaller than that 
of purchased land, ranging from 0.1 to 0.5 ha, the average being 0.3 ha. The 
sizes of the farms operated by the land-renting households ranged widely, 
from 0.3 to 3.7 ha, the average being 1.2 ha. Household income per adult 
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equivalent of the land-renting households varied across all income quartiles. 
Both land-hungry and land-rich households resorted to land rental markets. 
For the poor household, the aim of renting land was to secure its survival. A 
69-year-old man in Horo, for example, only had a small (0.03 ha) piece of 
land of his own and rented an additional 0.2 ha on which he grew maize for 
home consumption. His household was ranked in the bottom income quartile. 
For the wealthier households, on the other hand, the aim was to maximize 
their farm income by increasing farm size. A wealthy farmer in Kachamba, 
for example, rented 0.2 ha and 0.4 ha pieces of land in the nearby village at 
the cost of about US$10 per year. In his village he already had a 3.1 ha piece 
of land, parts of which had been purchased in 1997. His farm was the largest 
in the village, and the household income per adult equivalent was the second 
highest. Thus, land rental plays two roles in the vernacular land markets in 
situations in which land is scarce. On the one hand, it enables the farmers 
lacking land to acquire their means of survival by obtaining additional land. 
On the other hand, it provides opportunities for wealthy farmers to further 
expand their farm acreage. Thus, the effects of the development of land 
rental markets are not unidirectional, as they would be in the case of land 
purchase.
Although the emerging vernacular land markets have these important im-
plications, the extent to which the vernacular land markets have developed 
remains relatively limited in the villages studied. Only six cases of land pur-
chase were found in three of the six villages studied while the number of 
cases of land acquisition based on the non-market-based customary rules 
(gifts, inheritance, and allocation by village head) was 200 (Table 2.1). Land 
rental was more active (18 cases) than land purchase and was found in four 
villages studied, but the number was smaller than that of the cases of land 
borrowed free of charge from relatives and friends (24 cases). Overall, the 
cases of market-based land transactions (purchase and rent) accounted for 10 
percent of the total cases of land transactions and those of land purchase only 
2 percent. Thus, the vernacular land markets have taken place in the villages 
studied only to a limited extent.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the interrelationship between the actual land 
transactions that were observed in the villages studied on the one hand and 
customary land tenure and inheritance rules on the other. The case studies 
reveal that although the majority of land transactions followed the customary 
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land tenure systems and inheritance rules of each community, in a good 
number of cases land transactions deviated from the basic rules. One factor 
behind the deviation was the unique personal relationships that developed 
between original landholders and heirs. Another factor was the seemingly 
increasing number of cases of wives returning to patrilineal villages. Still 
another factor was the intensifying scarcity of land which encouraged villag-
ers to adopt strategies to obtain land rights from any source and by any means. 
But there were also some cases in which the same problem of land scarcity 
induced villagers to countercheck the practice of flexible land transfers to 
prevent their lineage land from being alienated to non-kin. These facts sug-
gest that, in a situation in which land is scarce, an individual strategy to obtain 
land rights from any possible source by deviating from customary rules may 
occasionally be in conflict with lineage strategies to countercheck that ten-
dency to protect lineage land.
This chapter has also shown that the vernacular land markets have been 
developing recently in rural Malawi. However, the development is still lim-
ited and relatively weak, as the strength of kinship remains the main force 
behind land transactions. But the limited number of cases of vernacular land 
markets shows some important characteristics. In the land-sales markets, it is 
the wealthier segment of the rural population that has taken advantage of the 
opportunities generated by the vernacular land markets to obtain relatively 
large tracts of land. In the land-rental markets, transactions occur on a much 
smaller scale than in the land-sales markets in terms of land-plot size but on 
a larger scale in terms of the number of cases. In addition, land-rental markets 
are utilized by both poor and wealthy households for different purposes.
Revisiting the debate over whether the contemporary dynamics of land 
rights in rural Africa have led to adaptive and negotiable customary land 
systems or to a growing inequality and social differentiation, this chapter has 
revealed a mixed, complex, and non-unidirectional picture. On the one hand, 
we observed many cases of adaptive and flexible applications of customary 
land tenure and inheritance rules that enabled the less powerful segment of 
the rural population to obtain land rights. On the other hand, the same flexible 
and adaptive application of customary rules generated conflicts between indi-
viduals and lineages. The emerging vernacular land markets also resulted in 
the undetermined outcomes of providing different opportunities to both the 
poor and the rich. This bewildering array of results better represents the 
complex reality of rural Malawi than oversimplified and unidirectional inter-
pretations of the contemporary dynamics of the agrarian economy.
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Notes
  1   This chapter is based on Takane (2008).
  2    This critique has also been made in ethnographic terms by Englund (2002) in the 
study of contemporary Malawi. 
  3    This does not mean that the customary land tenure guarantees equitable access of 
land to the community members. A local “custom” is often subject to manipula-
tions by powerful elites and a discourse on “custom” frequently upholds inequal-
ities within a community (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003).
  4    In this book, gifting refers to cases where one obtains land from a relative while 
the relative is still alive. Inheritance refers to cases where one obtains land after 
the death of the original landholder.
  5    Kishindo (1995) and Place and Otsuka (2001) argue that under uxorilocal mar-
riage, men have weak land-right security in the early period of the marriage, and 
they thus lack incentives to make long-term investments in the land.
  6    Vaughan (1983) also points out the lack of fit between socioeconomic realities 
and people’s public expression of their culture in rural Malawi.
  7    Some of the original settlers, including the senior brother who later became vil-
lage headman, were still alive at the time of the survey.
  8    Inheritance of land from father to children was also reported by Mkandawire in 
the Lilongwe Rural Development Project (Mkandawire 1984) and by Englund in 
the Dedza District (Englund 1996, 1999)
  9    In the four cases, the average landholding size of the husband was 0.897 ha, while 
that of wife was 0.354 ha.
10    Peters emphasizes the increasing inequality and conflict over land in Africa in 
general (Peters 2004a) and southern Malawi in particular (Peters 2002, 2007).
11    There were two cases in which the villagers obtained land rights through the 
village headman’s allocation. In both cases, land had been allocated a long time 
ago, in 1987 and 1949.
12    Until the mid-nineteenth century, the Tumbuka followed matrilineal inheritance 
and uxorilocal residence. However, after being conquered by the patrilineal 
Ngoni around 1855, the Tumbuka gradually adopted Ngoni-patterned patrilineal-
ity, virilocal residence, and bridewealth payments (Vail and White 1989, pp. 
152–53).
13    In six of the cases, land was obtained by women. These cases will be examined 
in Chapter 7.
14    Case 4 was not a sample household and therefore not counted in Table 2.1.
15    A 1/50,000 scale map produced by the Department of Surveys based on aerial 
photography done in 1970 showed nothing but “orchard bush” and no settlement 
in the area today covered by Belo.
16    The only exception was the original settler of Kachamba, who purchased land 
from the local chief in 1953.
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17    The case of the original settler in Kachamba who purchased land in 1953 is ex-
cluded here.
18    Income quartiles were obtained by ranking all sample households in each village 
studied according to income per adult equivalent unit and dividing them into four 
equal groups. For the income disparities among the sample households, see 
Chapter 6.

